

## **NAHT evidence to the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) 29<sup>th</sup> remit**

### **Introduction**

1. NAHT welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) to inform its 29<sup>th</sup> remit report.
2. NAHT is the UK's largest professional association for school leaders. We represent more than 29,000 head teachers, executive heads, CEOs, deputy and assistant heads, vice principals and school business leaders. Our members work across: the early years, primary, special and secondary schools; independent schools; sixth form and FE colleges; outdoor education centres; pupil referral units, social services establishments and other educational settings.
3. In addition to the representation, advice and training that we provide for existing senior leaders, we also support, develop and represent the senior leaders of the future, through NAHT Edge, the middle leadership section of our association. We use our voice at the highest levels of government to influence policy for the benefit of leaders and learners everywhere.
4. In structuring our submission for the 29<sup>th</sup> remit, we have provided a brief background and overview; considered the evidence presented to the 28<sup>th</sup> remit; the Review Body's recommendations; and the Secretary of State's response.
5. We have provided a detailed commentary on the Secretary of State's letter that sets out the areas for consideration by the Review Body for this year's remit. We explain: our view that the 'affordability' of any pay uplift is not a matter that the STRB is in a position to judge; why we continue to oppose differentiated pay awards; how pay 'autonomy' is not possible given the school funding crisis; and why it is critical that the Review body is clear that fully funded uplifts to pay are an essential element in creating a positive proposition for a career in teaching.
6. In addition to providing insight through the key findings from our (as yet unpublished) annual longitudinal survey of members, we also submit a review of other key evidence, and data and academic research, including: recruitment to initial teacher training; teachers from other countries; retention trends; and workforce data.
7. We conclude by setting out the case for a pay uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment.
8. NAHT is mindful that an additional remit is expected from the Secretary of State in the early part of 2019, focusing on the broader question of the pay

structure. In this submission we repeat our call for the reintroduction of national pay scales; the inclusion of CEO and other similar roles within the STCPD; the specification of leadership time for deputy and assistant head teachers, and vice principals; and the development of a key worker package to offset high living costs. We intend to provide further evidence on these matters in our submission to the expected additional remit.

## **Background - Teachers' and School leaders' pay in context**

9. Over successive remits, NAHT has presented wide-ranging evidence, underpinned by our own research and that of other respected bodies, to demonstrate that ending the long-term decline in the real value of teachers' and school leaders' pay is of critical importance in tackling the ongoing recruitment and retention crisis that afflicts teaching.
10. NAHT recognises that the Review Body both understands and broadly agrees with this analysis; and that it has been previously fettered in the exercise of its independent role by government's insistence that its recommendations should not breach the public sector pay cap.
11. The STRB's 26<sup>th</sup> report (2016) set out its clear view that '*...based on our assessment of recruitment and retention considerations alone, there is a case for an uplift higher than 1% to the national pay framework, to strengthen the competitive position of the teaching profession at a time of growing demand for graduates.*'<sup>1</sup>
12. A year later the Review Body referenced the need for '*...longer-term investment in an effective teaching workforce through prioritising teacher recruitment and retention,*'<sup>2</sup> recognising that '*...teacher retention rates continued to fall, particularly for those in the early stages of their career, and that targets for ITT recruitment continue to be missed.*'<sup>3</sup> It concluded that the pressure on teacher supply '*...presents a substantial risk to the functioning of an effective education system, particularly in the context of increasing demand for secondary phase teachers and specialists in EBacc.*'<sup>4</sup>

## **The 28<sup>th</sup> remit – an unequivocal case for an uplift to all pay and allowances in payment**

13. Our evidence to the 27<sup>th</sup> remit referenced TUC research that calculated that teachers' pay had **fallen** by 10.4 per cent in real terms between 2010 and 2016.<sup>5</sup> NAHT was therefore heartened by the Chief Secretary's letter

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<sup>1</sup> [STRB 26th report](#), 2016 p ix

<sup>2</sup> [STRB 27th report](#), 2017 p 61

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p 62

<sup>4</sup> Ibid p 62

<sup>5</sup> [Lift the Cap: A fair deal for public sector workers](#), TUC p6

in advance of the 28<sup>th</sup> remit which followed government's effective removal of the public sector pay cap, and seemed to indicate a stronger commitment to acting upon the recommendations of independent of pay review bodies.

14. The Chief Secretary wrote: '*...it is of even greater importance that recommendations on annual pay awards are based on independent advice and robust evidence...that takes into account the context of wider economic circumstances, private sector comparators and the overall remuneration of public sector workers...The role of Pay Review bodies is therefore more important than ever.*'<sup>6</sup>
15. Given the STRB's evident grasp of the recruitment and retention crisis, NAHT was confidently optimistic that the Review Body would carefully weigh the evidence that underpinned our argument for a pay uplift.
16. Our detailed response made a case for the STRB to make a clear and unequivocal recommendation for a 5 per cent uplift to pay that:
  - provided **every** teacher and school leader with a **cost of living** pay rise that protected their salary from further erosion against the current and rising rate of inflation, along with a **restorative** element to act as a first step towards returning the real value of all teaching salaries to their 2010 level.
  - did **not** adopt a differential approach to pay, recognising that focusing an increase only on early career teachers would do nothing to improve retention and would, conversely, undermine the morale of existing teachers who had endured seven years of cuts to real pay while delivering a new national curriculum and new assessment methodologies across all phases.
  - was **fully funded** and applied equally to all salaries and allowances in payment, to ensure that the immense pressure of the continuing funding crisis on school budgets was not further exacerbated – we noted that paying teachers and school leaders fairly could not be at the expense of their pupils.
17. The STRB's 28<sup>th</sup> report provided an unequivocal recognition of that evidence, spelling out the impact that the real terms decline in salaries continues to have upon recruitment and retention in the teaching profession.
18. The detail of the 28<sup>th</sup> report<sup>7</sup> remains precise, accurate and pertinent:

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<sup>6</sup> [Letter of the Chief Secretary to the STRB Chair](#), 21 September 2017, p2

<sup>7</sup> [STRB 28th remit report, 2018](#)

- *‘Teaching has continued to lag behind other graduate professions, both in terms of starting salaries and pay progression prospects.’*
  - *‘Over recent years, the relative position of classroom teachers’ median earnings has deteriorated.’*
  - *‘Data from major graduate recruiters suggest a continuing significant gap between teachers’ minimum starting salaries and median starting pay in other professions.’*
  - *‘The overall position of teaching in the graduate labour market has deteriorated since STRB’s last report, exacerbating the challenges faced in attracting good graduates to become teachers and retaining teachers in the profession.’*
  - *‘The evidence shows that there has been very little improvement in any aspect of the teacher supply situation since last year, while there is clear evidence that some factors, most notably teacher recruitment, have worsened.’*
  - *‘There is evidence that teacher supply challenges are apparent across the school system in England and Wales and at all stages of teachers’ careers.’*
  - *‘The pay and allowance framework is central to making teaching an attractive and rewarding career and signalling to graduates the value that is placed on the profession.’*
  - *‘The relative pay trends described above are important contributory factors in the recruitment and retention problems facing the teaching profession in England and Wales.’*
  - *‘Few classroom teachers tell [the STRB] ...they aspire to become senior leaders, and most assistant and deputy heads... do not wish to become head teachers. The statistical evidence available also supports this picture, showing emerging problems in recruiting and retaining school leaders.’<sup>8</sup>*
19. The Review Body’s recommendation to government was **crystal** clear and left no scope for misinterpretation: a *‘...significant pay uplift to teachers’ pay is required to forestall a further weakening in the competitive position of the teaching profession.’<sup>9</sup>*
20. NAHT welcomed the STRB’s recommendation that **all pay and allowance** ranges for teachers and school leaders **should be uplifted**.
21. We also welcomed the STRB’s recognition that an above inflation pay uplift for all teachers and school leaders was warranted, noting that implementation of the review body’s recommendation would serve to protect salaries from erosion against inflation. While we were disappointed that the Review Body’s recommendation of a 3.5 per cent uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment fell significantly short of our

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<sup>8</sup> [ibid](#)

<sup>9</sup> [Ibid](#)

joint call for a 5 per cent uplift, this would, in our view, have signaled a small first step towards reversing the real terms losses of recent years.

### **The Secretary of State's response to the 28<sup>th</sup> report.**

22. Once again, there was a long delay on the part of government in concluding the remit. When the 28<sup>th</sup> report was finally published alongside the Secretary of State's response most schools had already broken for the summer holidays.
23. The damage that this has caused to morale in the profession should not be underestimated. Whatever government's reason for the delay, the belated response at best might be interpreted as incompetent, ill-judged or thoughtless; at worst as callous and cynical.
24. The Secretary of State's announcement rejected the STRB's carefully evidenced recommendation for an across the board 3.5 per cent uplift for all teachers and school leaders, and instead imposed a differentiated pay uplift of 3.5 per cent for teachers on the main pay range; 2 per cent for teachers on the upper pay range and 1.5 per cent for those on the leadership pay range.
25. No rationale or explanation was provided, beyond a short ministerial statement. Serving school leaders still have no properly articulated explanation for the Secretary of State's decision to disregard the Review Body's evidence-based recommendations. School leaders have not been offered any reasoning as to why they have received another effective pay cut, while their least experienced staff members have been judged to be deserving of a real terms pay increase.
26. It is unconscionable that school leaders, who have carried the greatest responsibility and heaviest burden for delivering the government's wholesale changes to the school curriculum and statutory assessment arrangements, should be treated in this way. This derisory award shows a fundamental lack of respect for their professionalism, dedication and commitment of school leaders. It also fails to meet any reasonable test of **fairness**.
27. Understandably, our members are angry and demoralised by government's decision. Our members are clear that their experience and expectation is that government should have accepted and acted upon the independent review body's recommendation.
28. Our response to the statutory consultation on the Secretary of State's response to the 28<sup>th</sup> report of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) contained our analysis of other public sector pay awards that were announced at the same time as those for the teaching profession

(appended to this submission). This showed not only that other Secretaries of State had respected much more closely the advice of their independent pay review bodies, but in a further insult to our members, it revealed that **only school leaders received a pay increase below 2 per cent.**

29. In its role as an independent body appointed to examine and report on statutory pay for the teaching profession in England, the STRB had examined the case for a differentiated uplift at the government's request. It had reviewed and considered a wide range of evidence and **concluded that a differentiated award was not appropriate.**
30. The Review Body specifically stated that there was a need to '*...improve the relative position of the teachers' pay framework in the labour market for graduate professions and, by so doing, address the deteriorating trends in teacher retention.*' It recognised the urgency of the situation noting that '*...unless we act now, graduate pay will have moved still further ahead of current teacher pay ranges by September 2019.*'<sup>10</sup>
31. The STRB made specific reference to the difficulty of recruiting school leaders, the decline in retention rates for head teachers and that few deputies or assistants aspire to become heads – stating that '*...the level of pay...must be sufficient that people stepping up to such leadership responsibilities feel that they are being fairly remunerated for the additional responsibilities and pressures they are taking on.*'<sup>11</sup>
32. The evidence provided to government about the pressure and risks to the supply of school leaders was abundantly clear, yet government chose to ignore it.
33. We set out our view that the decision contradicted the government's professed commitment to act upon the recruitment and retention crisis. A timely opportunity to send a positive message that affirmed the value of **the profession as a whole**, was squandered.

### **The Secretary of State's remit for the STRB's 29<sup>th</sup> report**

34. NAHT urges the STRB to be robust in its approach to the remit as set out by the Secretary of State in his letter of 21 November 2018.<sup>12</sup>
35. Our starting point for the evidence that we provide is that there has **been no substantive or significant improvement** to the national state of teacher and school leader supply, including rates of retention, vacancy rates or the quality of candidates entering the profession. **All of our**

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid p64

<sup>11</sup> Ibid p63

<sup>12</sup> [Letter from Damian Hinds to Dr Patricia Rice](#)

**previously submitted evidence to the preceding remit continues to apply.**

36. We do, of course, provide **new evidence below**. However, this broadly tells the same story of the last five or so years: an **ever-worsening** picture of teacher and school leader shortages driven by the **failure to recruit** sufficient graduates into teaching; the **failure to retain** serving teachers; the **failure to attract** teachers into leadership roles; and the **failure to retain leaders**.

*'Affordability'*

37. NAHT **urges the Review Body to reject** the Secretary of State's instruction that the STRB should have regard to *'...the need to ensure that any proposals are affordable across the school system as a whole...'* and *the request that the Review Body should '...describe what steps [it has] taken to ensure affordability has been given due consideration when reaching...recommendations.'*<sup>13</sup>
38. Our view is that this is an **impossible instruction** for the STRB to fulfil, and one that is beyond its statutory functions. Specifically:
- the affordability of a recommended pay award is a matter for government, not the STRB – any decision about affordability is essentially a political decision
  - the STRB is not in a position to know the mind of government, nor does it have insight with regard to the government's funding intentions and priorities for the forthcoming comprehensive spending review
  - the STRB is not in a position to make an assessment about affordability across the school system as a whole – this is a complex matter for DfE and the ESFA to address.
39. Notwithstanding the points above, a further objection to the inclusion of 'affordability criteria' within the STRB's remit is that this constitutes an **unspecified de facto pay cap**. This, in itself, is an unworkable condition for any review body to be placed under.
40. The Review Body is charged with arriving at an evidence-based view on teacher and school leader supply, taking account of vacancy rates and recruitment and retention issues alongside the wider labour market in England in order to make recommendations on the salary and allowance ranges for teachers and school leaders, so that pay acts as a lever on teacher supply.
41. Affordability or the implementation of any kind of pay cap is **irrelevant** to that labour market analysis. It is a matter for government to decide in light

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<sup>13</sup> [Ibid](#)

of the labour market analysis whether it chooses to fund teaching salaries at the recommended level in order to improve recruitment to, and retention in, the profession.

42. NAHT's strong view is that government's recent failure to heed the Review Body's advice has significantly damaged the morale of school leaders, exacerbating the existing drivers that lead individuals to leave the profession. We urge the STRB to make clear to government the implications of ignoring the weight of evidence and consequent independent recommendations of the Review Body.

*Areas of skills shortages and differentiated pay awards*

43. The Secretary of State's remit<sup>14</sup> letter suggests that the STRB will '*...want to consider how the pay award can best utilise the flexibility within the Government's pay policy to address areas of skill shortage...*' The letter continues by encouraging the STRB to '*...consider how the pay award can best encourage high quality entrants to join the profession and support their progression within the workforce.*'
44. It is worth noting here that NAHT has previously presented comprehensive and compelling evidence that establish that shortages occur throughout all phases and disciplines within the teaching profession.
45. The Secretary of State's focus only on those in the early years of a teaching career is extraordinarily misguided. DfE's policy priorities **still fail** to recognise that much stronger emphasis on retention is required. Targeting real pay increases on those within the first years of their career, while neglecting experienced teachers and school leaders, will do nothing to improve the skewed age profile in teaching. Indeed, it is likely to undermine retention, damaging the very career longevity that the DfE says it wishes to strengthen.
46. In our response to the 28<sup>th</sup> remit we set out our opposition to a differentiated pay award. We noted that focusing an increase on those in the very early years of teaching (or on teachers of particular subject specialisms) would further demoralise existing teachers and school leaders who have endured eight years of cuts to real pay. We cited evidence from our members who told us that differentiated pay awards are hugely unhelpful, creating division among the teaching workforce and unnecessary management challenges for school leaders.
47. We noted that recruitment and retention are inextricably linked: the investment in incentives to bring recruits into teaching needs to be

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid p1

matched by similar on-going investment to retain teachers and leaders within the system, and at all career stages.

48. In contrast to the general trend in other OECD countries, teachers' statutory salaries in England fell in real terms by about 10 per cent between 2005 and 2017.<sup>15</sup> Declining real pay and the lack of pay progression is now a significant threat to the retention of existing teachers and school leaders, made all the more serious by last year's extraordinary decision to deliver a real terms pay cut for these professionals.
49. The grinding impact of years of falling real pay resulting from a public sector pay restraint policy, at a time when schools were required to implement controversial and wholesale change to curriculum and assessment arrangements across all phases of education, cannot be over emphasised.
50. Research by the Institute for Fiscal studies confirms that the earnings premium accruing to graduates remains robust,<sup>16</sup> while the Education Policy Institute has correctly pointed to pay as a factor in declining retention rates.<sup>17</sup> However, NAHT **rejects** the simplistic conclusion that the solution lies in the development of a pay policy that is narrowly (or solely) focused on delivering higher pay or retention bonuses for those teachers of shortage subjects in their early years of teaching.
51. Existing research demonstrates that teachers in England already have the lowest job satisfaction of teachers in all English-speaking countries.<sup>18</sup> It is facile to imagine that delivering real terms pay increases for early career teachers, while continuing to impose real terms pay cuts on their experienced colleagues and school leaders will provide resolution to the recruitment and retention crisis.
52. Such an approach would further fragment the teaching profession undermining collegiality, collaboration and cohesion. There is a real risk of 'stop-go' policies leading to unsustainable demands which the majority of schools will be unable to meet given the parlous state of many school budgets. Narrowing pay differentials are continuing to **undermine the value of leadership** and experienced teachers' pay will exacerbate wastage rates, further destabilising the age and experience profile of the profession.
53. What is needed is a new pay settlement for the profession **as a whole** that contributes to a compelling and sustainable proposition for **teaching as a career**, with clear, transparent national pay scales and a range of

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<sup>15</sup> [OECD Education at a glance, 2018](#)

<sup>16</sup> [The impact of undergraduate degrees on early-career earnings](#)

<sup>17</sup> [EPI \(2018\). Is pay more important than workload for teacher retention?](#)

<sup>18</sup> [Zieger et al](#), September 2018

incentives to offset high living costs. Such a settlement must also be **demonstrably fair** to all within the profession.

54. We recognise that this is probably a matter to return to for the Review Body's second remit for 2019-20, but in the meantime urge the STRB to **reject any differential approach to pay** within this remit.
55. For its 28<sup>th</sup> remit the review body accepted the overwhelming evidence for a common pay uplift for all salaries and allowances in payment. That evidence has **not** changed since the announcement of the Secretary of State's response in July 2018. **We urge the STRB to recommend a 5 per cent uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment, and to make the case against a differentiated pay rise to government in the strongest possible terms**, in order to prevent further damage to the profession.
56. Below, we set out why autonomy in pay arrangements, the so-called pay 'freedoms' and performance related pay progression has comprehensively failed to have any discernible impact on the recruitment and retention crisis.
57. NAHT is unclear why government continues to focus almost solely on incentives for new entrants and early career teachers. England already has a structural age imbalance within the teaching profession, simply because attrition and wastage rates are so high. The proportion of full-time equivalent teachers older than 50 has decreased from 23 per cent in 2010 to 17 per cent in 2016, in both the primary and secondary phases. At the same time, the proportion of primary teachers who are younger than 30 and secondary teachers in their 30s and early 40s has increased since 2010.<sup>19</sup> We have one of the youngest teaching workforces of among all OECD countries<sup>20</sup> because burn-out rates are so high.

#### *Autonomy in pay arrangements*

58. NAHT hopes that the second remit for the STRB in January 2019 will offer an opportunity for us to provide evidence for the Review Body on the efficacy and impact of the pay 'freedoms' introduced in 2013.
59. However, these matters are relevant to the current remit because the Secretary of State's letter instructs the STRB to have regard to the autonomy that head teachers and governing boards have to develop individual pay arrangements for their schools within the statutory minima and maxima.

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<sup>19</sup> [NFER \(2018\). Teacher Workforce Dynamics](#)

<sup>20</sup> [OECD \(2018\). Education at a Glance](#)

60. NAHT originally offered conditional support for pay flexibilities and freedoms, including the establishment of performance related pay progression (PRPP), on the basis that this **remained distinct from** the annual review of teachers' pay conducted by the School Teachers' Review Body.
61. Over time the annual uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment that takes account of inflation, and which *should* be determined through the STRB process, has become unhelpfully conflated with the local exercise of pay flexibility related to performance. Indeed, government has driven this conflation through its instructions to the Review Body.
62. Furthermore, the worsening funding crisis means that the overwhelming majority of schools have insufficient financial manoeuvrability. The result is that schools are unable to effectively link teachers' and school leaders' pay to performance objectives to reward effective teaching - even assuming that this can be reliably measured. Furthermore, schools are restricted in their capacity to develop localised pay scales and progression models within pay policies that best meet the particular needs of the school, because they lack the financial headroom to do so.
63. Five years on from the introduction of pay flexibility and PRPP, the conditions set by NAHT for successful delivery have not been met. The annual pay settlement has been paltry, delivering minimal rewards for individuals and below inflation pay awards that have led to a fall in real terms salaries. There is no doubt that this has damaged morale, demotivated teachers and school leaders, and undermined both recruitment and retention.
64. Following an evidence-based review, and in light of the experience of the last five years, NAHT's has re-evaluated our view of pay flexibilities and rescinded our support for PRPP. We intend to provide detailed evidence to the STRB to inform the second expected remit. The headline finding is that we have concluded that pay flexibility and performance related pay progression have, at best, **little or no impact** on the teaching profession. Our research has also identified significant **negative consequences** of this policy.
65. NAHT therefore **urges** the Review Body not to develop recommendations for the 2019/20 award that further embed, encourage or exploit pay flexibility or pay differentials, ahead of the second remit.

#### *Fully funded pay uplifts*

66. In its 28<sup>th</sup> report the STRB accepted the compelling evidence for an above inflation pay uplift for all teachers and school leaders. Our evidence

stressed the importance of government fully funding an increase to ensure that all schools had the resources to deliver the pay award.

67. Through the ‘teachers’ pay grant’ government have provided a mechanism by which additional funding for the 2018/19 pay award is provided to schools. However, it is important to note that this **falls short** of fully funding the pay award, as the first one per cent of the award had to be met from schools’ existing budgets: the grant was made on the assumption that all schools already had sufficient headroom in their budgets to pay a one per cent award. Of course, this was not the case for all schools.
68. A second issue is that the pay grant that each school receives is derived from a calculation based on the size of the average teacher wage bill for its sector (whether primary, secondary or Special school), to which the Area Cost Adjustment is applied; funding is then distributed on a per pupil rate.
69. This has the effect of creating ‘winners and losers’. Around a third (33 per cent) of schools will receive between 5 and 25 per cent less than the cost of the salary increase. This will mean that schools with high levels of disadvantage or small class sizes will be less likely to receive enough additional funding to cover the cost of the uplift to their teachers’ pay.<sup>21</sup> This introduces further financial stress within the school system and a second consecutive year where there is variability in the application of the pay uplift from school to school.
70. While these matters are seemingly of tangential concern to the statutory work of the STRB, they underline the points we raise above about the need to avoid any reliance on pay autonomy or progression measures as a means of resolving the recruitment and retention crisis. To build an attractive proposition for teaching as a career there is an urgent need to restore the real value of teaching salaries across the profession. This implies a return to **the predictability of national pay scales**, a transparent national approach to **pay progression** and a recognition that there is a need for an annual pay uplift that is distinct from any measurement of performance to ensure that salaries keep pace with other comparable graduate professions.

*The remit letter fails to recognise the need for competitive pay in the teaching profession*

71. A complex combination of inadequate pay and pay progression, unnecessary workload and high stakes accountability combine to make teaching unattractive both to new entrants and those already employed within the profession. Attractive marketing and advertising, setting out the

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<sup>21</sup> [Winners and Losers from the Teachers’ Pay Grant](#), EPI, November 2018

vocational rewards that can be gained from teaching will not solve the crisis. Teaching is a professional graduate occupation and should be rewarded commensurately. Delivering competitive pay, clear pay progression and attractive working conditions is a central requirement if teaching is to compete with other graduate occupations.

72. NAHT has engaged constructively and formatively with the DfE to help shape the recruitment and retention strategy, and the associated Early Career Framework that is intended to support early career teachers in their extended NQT period. There is much to commend in this work, which in the longer term has the potential to develop a range of flexible non-leadership pathways and qualifications that would better support the retention of mid-career teachers. There could be potential to create opportunities for movement between non-leadership and leadership pathways, and to offer flexibility and support to late career teachers and leaders.
73. However, **pay** is a critical, but **largely absent**, component from the DfE's attempts to develop a compelling 'proposition' for teaching as a career. The **absence of any clear strategy on pay and pay progression**, coupled with nearly a decade's erosion of real terms salaries in the teaching profession, is likely to mean that well intentioned strategies, such as those to support early career teachers through the Early Career Framework, will founder without action on pay.
74. Below we provide further evidence to restate the case for urgent action on pay within the profession. It is not possible to over-emphasise the importance of competitive remuneration and good conditions of service, as key elements of any strategy to solve the recruitment and retention crisis in teaching.

### **NAHT's own evidence**

75. In our evidence presented to the STRB on its 28<sup>th</sup> remit, NAHT set out clear findings from our annual recruitment survey of members. *The Leaky Pipeline*<sup>22</sup> reported members' experiences: for the fourth consecutive year, school leaders reported difficulty in recruiting across all roles, from teachers to senior leaders.
76. Our most recent survey of members (due for publication in early 2019) paints a depressingly familiar picture, in line with previous surveys. We surveyed members in October and November 2018. The 734 respondents in England told us that for the fifth consecutive year, school leaders reported that they struggled to recruit across all roles from teachers to senior leaders. Overall, a very high proportion (76 per cent) of responses

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<sup>22</sup> [NAHT \(2017\) The Leaky Pipeline](#)

indicated that it was difficult to recruit to any post. Of the total responses to this question, 62 per cent struggled to recruit and 14 per cent failed to recruit at all.

77. Recruitment difficulties for the main middle leadership roles in schools continue to be pronounced: 59 per cent of respondents said they struggled to recruit to posts carrying a teaching and learning responsibility (TLR) or for a Special Educational Needs Coordinator (SENCOs); and one in five (20 per cent) of respondents reported failing to recruit altogether.
78. Respondents reported that recruitment to head teacher or principal roles has become even more difficult during the last year. Two-thirds (66 per cent) of those who had recruited a head or principal reported struggling to do so, and 12 per cent failed to recruit at all. The proportion reporting failure to recruit to a head of school role more than doubled from just over one in ten (12 per cent) in 2017 to more than a quarter (27 per cent) in 2018.
79. Recruitment campaigns continued to fail to produce a high-quality field from which to recruit experienced teachers: 61 per cent of respondents cited a lack of quality applicants in their area; almost half (46 per cent) said this was due to a shortage of teachers and just over a third (37 per cent) cited teachers in their area leaving the profession as a reason.
80. The cost of housing continues to be a major barrier to recruitment: almost a third (30 per cent) of respondents cited high housing and living costs as a factor, in line with our previous surveys (31% in both 2017 and 2016).
81. For those that failed to recruit, supply agencies were the most common solution for unfilled roles, in almost three-quarters (72 per cent) of cases. However, the severity of the school funding crisis is evidenced by approaching half (44 per cent) of respondents reporting that their solution was for the teaching hours to be covered by a member of the senior leadership team – consistent with our 2017 findings.
82. The increasing pressure on leadership time emerges as a consistent theme in our surveys and discussions with members. Leaders are increasingly plugging the gaps in provision that result from teacher shortages or reductions in the hours and/or number of posts of teaching assistants, adding to their workload and placing pressure on strategic leadership functions. According to the latest School Workforce Statistics, the number of teaching assistants has fallen from 265,600 to 262,800.<sup>23</sup>
83. A further response to the funding crisis has also been for schools to seek savings by restructuring leadership teams, often by not replacing posts when a member of the team leaves. The burden of existing work is then

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<sup>23</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2017](#)

shared across fewer shoulders, adding to existing workloads. With school leaders working on average more than 60 hours a week,<sup>24</sup> it's little wonder, then, that only about a third<sup>25</sup> of our deputy and assistant head teachers intend to step up to headship. A quarter (25 per cent) of respondents to this year's survey told us that protecting leadership time would make the greatest contribution to easing the recruitment and retention crisis.<sup>26</sup>

84. The points above demonstrate why last year's differentiated pay award has been met with complete incredulity and justifiable frustration among our members. School leaders work longer hours and have greater responsibility than teachers on the main pay range. They are at the sharp end of managing the effects and the impact of the funding crisis, yet they received another real terms pay cut; at the same time the pay differential for leadership was deliberately narrowed. It is hard to imagine a more misguided approach to managing the morale of school leaders.
85. Over two-thirds (67 per cent) of respondents to our latest annual survey, told us they were aware of at least one member of their staff having left the teaching profession in the last year for reasons other than retirement, confirming a emerging trend. Of these, almost three in ten (28 per cent) stated that the reason was due to, "pay being 'insufficient,'" an increase of 7 percent on our 2017 survey.<sup>27</sup>
86. For the first time this year, we asked our members if they were thinking of leaving the profession. Just over a third (34 per cent) who responded told us they were considering leaving the profession.
87. Also for the first time this year we asked members what one thing they thought would make the greatest contribution to easing the recruitment and retention crisis in schools; almost two-thirds (64 per cent) told us that a 'real terms improvement in pay & conditions' would make the greatest contribution (to easing the recruitment and retention crisis in schools).<sup>28</sup>
88. The quantitative and qualitative evidence from our members is clear – the experience of school leaders finds that there is no let up in the impact of the recruitment and retention crisis.

## **Review of other evidence and key data**

### *Recruitment to Initial Teacher Training*

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<sup>24</sup> [DfE \(2017\). Teacher Workload Survey 2016](#)

<sup>25</sup> [NAHT \(2016\): The Balancing Act](#)

<sup>26</sup> Respondents could select up to three responses

<sup>27</sup> Respondents could select multiple options

<sup>28</sup> Respondents could select up to three responses

89. DfE statistics for 2018<sup>29</sup> show that the teacher training targets were missed in all subjects, except biology, PE, English and history. Tellingly, history - traditionally a surplus subject - narrowly crept across the line by just one per cent, with applications lagging behind until late spring. This year, once again, almost one in five (19 per cent) maths trainee places were unfilled.
90. For the sixth consecutive year recruitment targets for trainees across many subjects have been missed. The latest Initial Teacher Training (ITT) census<sup>30</sup>, shows that, taken together, recruitment to the English Baccalaureate (Ebacc) subjects was 89 per cent of the Teacher Supply Model (TSM) target overall.

This represents a small improvement on the previous year (82 per cent) but is substantially impacted by a surplus (153 per cent) recruitment of Biology specialists against the requirements of the supply model. This surplus in this single group therefore accounts for almost five percentage points of the seven per cent improvement on the Ebacc target. For the 2018-19 recruitment round, applications primary ITT courses recruited just 103 per cent of the Teacher Supply Model target.<sup>31</sup>

91. In our evidence to the 28<sup>th</sup> remit NAHT submitted an analysis of 'live' UCAS data which evidenced an alarming shortfall in applications to initial teacher training (ITT) in year on year applications, which only recovered towards the very end of the application period.
92. The latest data for this application round<sup>32</sup> shows an even greater shortfall in December 2018. The number of **applicants** (12,140) is five per cent lower than in December 2017 (12,820), and 37 per cent lower than in December 2016 when there were 19,330 applicants recorded.
93. This year the number of **applications** (prospective trainees may make up to three applications) for ITT courses in December 2018 was 31,890 – a 7 per cent decrease from December 2017, when 34,200 applications were recorded.<sup>33</sup>
94. The latest monthly data from UCAS published in December 2018 shows a 13 per cent decrease in applications for primary ITT in December 2018 (15,230 applications) compared to December 2017 (17,560 applications).<sup>34</sup> This provides a further indicator that may represent a significant worsening of the long running recruitment and retention crisis.

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<sup>29</sup> [DfE ITT Census for academic year 2018 to 2019, England](#)

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> [UCAS Teacher Training statistical releases](#)

<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

This 13 per cent decrease has occurred despite huge spending (£12,180,000 in 2017/18) on marketing by DfE.<sup>35</sup>

95. Applications to secondary ITT courses remain flat with 16,550 applications in December 2018 compared to 16520 in December 2017.
96. We also reiterate that the difficulties in teacher supply are likely to be underestimated by the Census. In addition to the ‘masking’ of the cumulative effects of missed targets, not all trainees come onto the ‘open market’ at the completion of their period of training because many are on employed school-based routes. Interesting work by Professor John Howson of TeachVac<sup>36</sup> tracks and calculates the ‘available pool’ of trainees (those who will enter the job market), projecting supply forward and offering a more nuanced view than the Census.

#### *The impact and efficacy of bursaries*

97. It could be that the 73 per cent increase in the available bursary for biology trainees in 2018/19<sup>37</sup> has driven an increase in numbers taking up teacher training places. English bursaries rose from £9,000 to £15,000<sup>38</sup> in the same period, possibly having influenced graduate choices, allowing the TSM target for English to be exceeded.
98. However, the evidence base for the impact of bursaries is weak. DfE’s teacher supply model team estimates spending on bursaries at over £1 billion since 2009/10, with spending reaching almost £200 million annually in both 2016/17 and 2017/18.<sup>39</sup> As noted above, TSM targets have been missed for each of the last six years, with no improvement in recruitment rates in sight.
99. DfE statistics show that between 2009/10 and 2015-16 108,790 bursary awards were made, representing 56 per cent of all post graduate trainees starting initial teacher training over the period, 93 per cent of whom achieved QTS. This differed little to the outcomes of the 91 per cent of non-bursary ITT trainees who achieved QTS.<sup>40</sup>
100. DfE data can be used to identify QTS holders who go onto teach in a state funded school but does not provide a longitudinal view about how long these teachers are retained within the state-funded school system. However, research demonstrates that there does not appear to be a

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<sup>35</sup> <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-03/198173>

<sup>36</sup> <http://teachvac.co.uk/>

<sup>37</sup> £26,000 in 2018/19 [source] compared to £15,000 in [source] 2017/18

<sup>38</sup> £215,000 in 2018/19 [source] compared to £9,000 in [source] 2017/18

<sup>39</sup> Discussion with DfE TSM team

<sup>40</sup> [Destinations of trainee teachers awarded a bursary](#), DfE, October 2018

positive correlation between high-funded bursaries and a propensity to teach in a state-funded school after QTS is achieved.<sup>41</sup>

101. For example, 18 per cent of physics bursary holders that achieved QTS did not go on to teach in a state-funded school. In 2018/19 the physics bursary was £26,000 for those holding first and second class degrees. Yet just 47 per cent of the trainees needed to fulfil the TSM target were recruited to ITT against a target that increased by 16 percent, representing a substantial fall on the 66 per cent achieved in 2017/18.<sup>42</sup>

102. EPI research suggests that the marginal cost per additional trainee of a £1,000 increase in bursaries could be as high as £60,000 in some subjects.<sup>43</sup>

103. NAHT remains very concerned that, despite having spent over a billion pounds, DfE has no clear evidence to determine whether bursaries represent value for money. What can be said with certainty is that the bursary structure has not delivered sufficient teachers to supply state-funded schools. This alone indicates that bursaries are of very limited effectiveness.

104. There is very little evidence to prove the efficacy of bursaries as a policy tool. They may make a period of initial teacher training more attractive, but this is not instrumental in creating the positive proposition for a career in the teaching profession required to support career longevity. A better co-ordinated approach that recognises that **retention** is of at least equal importance to recruitment is required.

105. Were it not so serious, there would be certain irony in the Secretary of State asking the Review Body to have regard to 'affordability' when framing its recommendations on pay, when the DfE is unable to demonstrate that the over £1 billion it has spent on bursaries represents value for money.

### *Teaching as an attractive career proposition*

106. As indicated above, DfE are taking some important steps forward through the development of a recruitment and retention strategy, and the associated Early Career Framework, that focus on providing better support and professional development to newly qualified teachers. NAHT welcomes these developments, but they fail to recognise pay as an important factor in the career choices of graduates.

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<sup>41</sup> Note that the research is based on experimental statistics

<sup>42</sup> [DfE ITT Census for academic year 2018 to 2019, England](#)

<sup>43</sup> [EPI \(2017\). The challenge of navigating teacher recruitment, pay and curriculum choices](#)

107. Government marketing accurately captures the moral purpose that brings many into the teaching profession: the desire to make a difference to children's and young people's lives is compellingly captured in emotionally moving advertising. But the proposition for a career in a graduate profession needs more than the promise of rewarding work. Teaching is an intellectually, emotionally and physically demanding profession – even if the excessive workload demands and high stakes accountability could be solved overnight, it would remain so.
108. But moral purpose has been proven to be an insufficient driver of retention. It is critical that government recognises that key pieces of the recruitment and retention jigsaw are missing. Delivering competitive starting pay; and ensuring there is a clear and predictable inflation proofed career pay structure, with adequate and transparent pay progression is essential; along with action on workload and the lowering the high stakes of the current accountability system.
109. It is simply not sustainable to hope to retain teachers and school leaders in the face of year on year real terms reductions in pay. The weight of evidence presented to the STRB through consecutive submissions points to pay as one of the 'big ticket' items that must be solved. The evidence demonstrates that teaching is simply not well enough rewarded in comparison to other similar graduate professions
110. Despite spending an estimated £12,180,000 on advertising to recruit to initial teacher training courses in the financial year 2017-18, the TSM targets were not achieved.<sup>44</sup> This represented an increase of almost £4.5 million on the *Get into Teaching* campaign that ran in the financial year to 31 March 2016,<sup>45</sup> and should be viewed in the context of a government commitment to spend £1.3 billion over the course of the parliament to encourage graduates to go into teaching.<sup>46</sup>

### *Teachers from other countries*

111. The latest available data shows that the award of Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) to teachers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA fell by 14 per cent between the financial year 2016-17 and 2017-18 (to 1,475).<sup>47</sup>
112. The award of QTS to qualified teachers from the European Economic Area (EEA) fell by 25 per cent over the same period to 3,525.<sup>48</sup> It seems reasonable to assume that Britain's impending departure from the

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<sup>44</sup> <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-03/198173>

<sup>45</sup> Source: written question 69258

<sup>46</sup> [Government response to the Education Select Committee](#)

<sup>47</sup> [Initial teacher training: trainee number census - 2017 to 2018](#)

<sup>48</sup> [Ibid](#)

European Union will result in fewer EEA teachers seeking the award of QTS to work in the UK if freedom of movement ends, further exacerbating the teacher supply crisis. Equally there may be an as yet undefined impact on the existing supply of teachers from Europe who may lose their right to live and work here after Britain leaves the EU.

### *Retention data*

113. DfE has focused very little of its resources on retaining existing teachers, yet this remains a problem that is at least as pressing as recruitment into the profession. Our submission to the 28<sup>th</sup> remit referenced the National Audit Office report *Retaining and developing the teaching workforce* which found that of the £35.7 million spent in 2016-17 programmes for teacher development and retention; just £91,000 was aimed at improving teacher retention.<sup>49</sup>
114. We noted that NfER's *Teacher retention and turnover research*<sup>50</sup> drew the conclusion that '*Rising pupil numbers in England's schools and shortfalls in the number of new teacher trainees mean that retaining teachers who are already in the profession is all the more important for managing the future supply of teachers.*'
115. The Review Body's 28<sup>th</sup> report recognised that leadership retention is now a matter of real concern<sup>51</sup>. NfER found that seven per cent of primary and ten per cent of secondary head teachers leave headship before retirement age each year.<sup>52</sup>
116. DfE data tables, replicated below, show that the growing crisis in leadership retention affects head teacher, deputy head teacher, assistant head teacher and middle leader roles. Close inspection of the data also reveals that while there has been a general trend towards a rise in total number of annual appointments to each leadership grade between 2011 and 2015, the trend in retention rate has continued to fall, worsening over time in post.
117. The rise in the total number of appointments means that the impact of similar or slightly lower retention rates is more pronounced than a casual reading of the data might indicate. For example, retention rates for primary assistant heads under 50 is recorded as 91 per cent in 2011, 2013 and 2014; however, the actual losses are 140, 216 and 285 respectively.

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<sup>49</sup> [NAO \(2017\). Retaining and developing the teaching workforce](#)

<sup>50</sup> [NfER: Teacher Retention and Turnover Research](#)

<sup>51</sup> [STRB 28th remit report, 2018](#)

<sup>52</sup> [Keeping your head: NfER Analysis of Headteacher Retention](#)

### Retention rates of new headteachers aged under 50 in primary schools<sup>53</sup>

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	1,020	93	90	86	83	78
2012	1,120	92	89	85	81	
2013	1,230	92	86	82		
2014	1,360	90	85			
2015	1,390	91				

### Retention rates of new headteachers aged under 50 in secondary schools<sup>54</sup>

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	250	90	84	78	69	65
2012	310	90	88	77	71	
2013	350	87	80	73		
2014	390	86	80			
2015	410	87				

### Retention rates of new deputy headteachers aged under 50 in primary schools<sup>55</sup>

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	1,590	91	85	80	79	75
2012	1,830	88	84	80	78	
2013	1,860	90	84	80		
2014	2,160	89	85			
2015	2,130	91				

### Retention rates of new deputy headteachers aged under 50 in secondary schools<sup>56</sup>

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	590	88	81	78	73	68
2012	750	87	83	75	71	
2013	780	88	83	76		
2014	960	86	75			
2015	870	85				

<sup>53</sup> [School leadership in England 2010 to 2016: characteristics and trends](#), Revised July 2018, p55

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Ibid p56

<sup>56</sup> Ibid p56

**Retention rates of new assistant headteachers aged under 50 in primary schools<sup>57</sup>**

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	1,270	91	85	81	78	74
2012	1,510	89	84	79	76	
2013	1,960	91	84	79		
2014	2,590	91	84			
2015	2,560	90				

**Retention rates of new assistant headteachers aged under 50 in primary schools<sup>58</sup>**

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	250	90	81	76	70	63
2012	310	87	80	74	67	
2013	350	88	80	71		
2014	390	85	76			
2015	410	84				

**Retention rates of new middle leaders aged under 50 in secondary schools<sup>59</sup>**

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	6,570	83	72	65	59	57
2012	7,180	80	68	66	63	
2013	8,570	79	68	64		
2014	9,550	76	66			
2015	11,120	78				

**Retention rates of new assistant headteachers aged under 50 in secondary schools<sup>60</sup>**

Year	New to post (rounded)	Percentage of headteachers retained after:				
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
2011	11,560	84	73	67	61	57
2012	12,560	82	71	64	60	
2013	14,080	80	68	62		
2014	17,890	79	68			
2015	17,200	80				

<sup>57</sup> Ibid p56

<sup>58</sup> Ibid p57

<sup>59</sup> Ibid p57

<sup>60</sup> Ibid p57

118. The time lag in the data series above is also likely to mean that current retention rates may actually be worse than reported. These data supports the conclusions contained in our 2017 *Leaky pipeline* report on the threat to the pipeline of future school leaders
119. EPI found that exit rates from the teaching profession increased from around eight per cent to 9.4 per cent in primary schools, and from 9.4 per cent to 10.4 per cent in secondary schools between 2011 and 2017. In special schools, the increase in exit rates was even larger, from 8.3 per cent to 10.6 per cent.<sup>61</sup>
120. The proportion of working age teachers leaving the profession has increased each year since 2010 in both primary and secondary schools.<sup>62</sup> DfE's own data shows that the proportion of teachers leaving teaching within three years of qualification rose again in 2017 to 27 per cent; up from 26 per cent in 2016 and 25 per cent in 2015<sup>63</sup>
121. Workforce data also fails to recognise that secondary subjects should be taught by subject specialists. Where subjects are taught by a non-specialist the vacancy is regarded as filled even though a teacher is unqualified in that subject. This has contributed to a situation where in 2017, for example, 22 per cent of maths teachers, over 18 per cent of English teachers and 38 per cent of Physics teachers had no relevant post A level qualification, according to the DfE's own data. Almost one in two teachers of Spanish did not have a specialist qualification for that language.<sup>64</sup>
122. The Teacher Supply Model takes no account of these data in the planning for the future needs of the school system in England, nor does it factor previous annual shortfalls into its calculations.
123. Given that the evidence suggests that it takes five years to become a really effective teacher, at which point a teacher begins to accrue significant additional value to the education system, the wastage of so many teachers to the profession at the three-year point therefore represents a significant cost, as well as a substantial loss to the nation's teaching capacity.
124. The need to retain teachers is underpinned by academic research which demonstrates that while teachers rapidly improve during the first three years of their career, they continue to show further measurable improvement for five to ten years after qualification.<sup>65</sup> Teacher

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<sup>61</sup> [EPI \(2018\). The teacher labour market in England: shortages, subject expertise and incentives](#)

<sup>62</sup> Opcit - NfER: Teacher Retention and Turnover Research

<sup>63</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2017](#)

<sup>64</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2017](#), DfE

<sup>65</sup> [Productivity returns in the teacher labor market](#), Papay et al, Harvard 2014

effectiveness is recognised as being the most important input for pupils and students, meaning that it is essential to ensure that there are enough good teachers in schools.<sup>66</sup>

125. Numerous studies point to a wide range of costs associated with chronic teacher turnover, including instructional and organisational impacts that negatively affect pupil outcomes and learning communities. The costs vary according to demographic and other factors but appear to have a disproportionate impact on students from disadvantaged backgrounds.<sup>67</sup>
126. The woeful retention rates in the teaching profession also represent a significant financial cost. About 40% of teachers are no longer employed in a state school five years after the completion of their initial teacher training. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) found that teacher training costs, on average, £23,000 per trainee (in costs to both government and schools). However, taking account of the high drop-out rate the IFS estimated that £38,000 is spent on training for every teacher still in post five years after completing training.<sup>68</sup>
127. OECD analysis reveals that the UK has the youngest (and therefore least experienced) teaching workforce among all OECD countries in primary education, and the second youngest (after Turkey) in lower secondary education. Over 31 per cent of primary teachers are aged under 30, compared to an OECD average of 12 per cent.<sup>69</sup>
128. The changing age profile demonstrates that it is proving increasingly difficult to retain mid-career and older teachers, who hold a wealth of expertise and knowledge, and the necessary experience to effectively mentor and support teachers at the early stages of their careers.
129. The proportion of fulltime equivalent teachers older than 50 has decreased by a quarter (from 23 to 17 per cent) between 2010 and 2017. More than half of teachers aged 50-59 who leave the profession are retiring early (58 per cent in primary and 62 per cent in secondary) while some are likely to be leaving for other opportunities and for other reasons.<sup>70</sup>
130. The evidence suggests the problems of teacher retention are further compounded in areas where the pay of other graduates is higher, and that those who teach in high priority subjects are the most responsive to external rates of pay. An IFS study underlined this finding; the probability of a teacher remaining in service decreases by 1 percentage point for a 10 percentage point increase in local wages. This effect is cumulative over

<sup>66</sup> [Human capital and education](#), Simon Burgess, *CMPO, University of Bristol and IZA, 2016*

<sup>67</sup> Achinstein et al., 2010; Allensworth et al., 2009; Balu, Beteille, & Loeb, 2009; Guin, 2004; Ingersoll, 2001; Johnson et al., 2005; Ronfeldt et al., 2013 in [Simon et al., 2015](#)

<sup>68</sup> [IFS \(2016\). The longer-term costs and benefits of different initial teacher training routes](#)

<sup>69</sup> [OECD Education at a glance, 2018](#)

<sup>70</sup> NfER (2018). [Teacher Workforce Dynamics in England](#)

time, meaning that over a period of five years a teacher would be one percentage point more likely to leave teaching *each year*.<sup>71</sup>

131. It is also worth noting that the apparently small differences in the rates at which teachers leave the profession masks important cumulative impacts. For example, an annual attrition rate of ten per cent compared to a rate of eight per cent appears to be a headline difference of only two percentage points, but actually leads to a seven percentage point difference in the number of teachers still in the profession after five years.<sup>72</sup>

#### *DfE workforce data*

132. DfE has now recognised that its school census<sup>73</sup> provides only a partial picture of school vacancies; its standard measurement vastly under reports the true scale of the challenge facing schools. For example, in November 2017 DfE census data indicated a 0.3 per cent vacancy rate, equivalent to just 940 vacancies.

133. However, it was possible to use DfE data to identify a clearer picture of the true vacancy rate, using 2016 data. This reported 12.3 per cent of all state funded schools overall reported having *at least* one advertised vacancy or one temporarily filled post on census day. Broken down by phase, the data showed an increase from 6.9 to 8.7 per cent for primary schools, and 23 to 27 per cent for secondary schools between 2015 and 2016.

134. The 2017 census does not appear to have reported this key information, but we have no reason to suppose that there has been any significant improvement in this rate. It may be helpful for the Review Body to seek an explanation from DfE as to why data that offers real insight into vacancy rates is either omitted from or very hard to locate, in this year's census.

135. These shocking data reveal the impact of the supply crisis: one in four secondary schools, and approaching one in ten primary schools, had pupils being taught by *at least* one temporary member of staff, or had *at least* one vacancy. The lack of stable, permanent staffing has a profoundly negative impact on the progress and attainment of pupils, ultimately affecting outcomes for pupils, their life chances and overall school performance.

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<sup>71</sup> [IFS \(2016\). The longer-term costs and benefits of different initial teacher training routes](#)

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid* p 5

<sup>73</sup> Opcit - School workforce in England: November 2018

136. TeachVac’s analysis of advertised vacancies would seem to underline this – it found that 9 per cent of schools in the primary sectors advertised for a head teacher, with a re-advertisement rate of 31 per cent.<sup>74</sup>
137. DfE’s analysis of teacher supply, retention and mobility found that more 3000 teachers left the profession than entered it in between 2015 and 2017. This was the case across all subjects except mathematics and physics in 2017; in 2016 this was the case for all subjects except English, Physics and History and in 2015 this was the case for all subjects except Mathematics and History. Almost one in two (56 per cent) modern foreign language teachers had left the profession within five years of qualification.<sup>75</sup> DfE’s school snapshot survey found that almost a third (31 per cent) of teachers were considering leaving teaching.<sup>76</sup>

### *Demographic factors*

138. DfE’s own evidence suggests that demographic factors have the potential to exacerbate the shortage of teachers and school leaders still further. The overall pupil population in secondary schools is projected to reach 3,267,000 by 2027, 418,000 higher than in 2018 and a 14.7% increase over the whole projection period.<sup>77</sup>
139. To prevent class sizes from rising, the total number of teachers would also need to grow. An estimated extra 47,000 secondary and 8,000 primary teachers will be needed by 2024, in order to maintain current pupil-teacher ratios. On average this would require an additional 11 teachers in every secondary school. The number of new entrants to teaching would also need to exceed those exiting the profession, rather than equalling them as at present.<sup>78</sup>
140. There are further challenges in secondary schools.<sup>79</sup> The government has set the ambition for 90 per cent of GCSE pupils to be entered into the English Baccalaureate (EBacc) by 2025, compared to the current entry rate of 38 per cent<sup>80</sup>. EPI analysis has suggested that the number of modern foreign languages teachers would need to increase by 78 per cent in 2019–20 in order to meet government targets.<sup>81</sup>
141. The Commission on Inequality in Education points to a range of hidden impacts of the recruitment and retention crisis. It found that the impact of the teacher shortage does not fall evenly across the school population:

<sup>74</sup> Analysis of leadership vacancies during 2017 in the primary school sector across England, TeachVac, Jan 2018

<sup>75</sup> [Analysis of teacher supply, retention and mobility](#), DfE, September 2018

<sup>76</sup> [School snapshot survey](#), July 2018

<sup>77</sup> [National pupil projections: July 2018](#)

<sup>78</sup> [EPI \(2018\). Analysis: Teacher labour market pressures](#)

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>80</sup> [Provisional GCSE and equivalent results in England, 2017 to 2018](#)

<sup>81</sup> [EPI \(2017\). Analysis: The challenge of navigating teacher recruitment, pay and curriculum choices](#)

- Schools with more affluent children have 12% of teachers with more than ten years of experience while the poorest have just 7%.
- The schools serving more disadvantaged communities also experience higher levels of teacher turnover than neighbouring, more advantaged schools.
- A secondary school teacher in the highest deprivation quintile school is, other things being equal, 70% more likely to leave than one at a neighbouring school in the lower deprivation quintile. The odds of leaving the highest deprivation quintile school at primary level are 20% higher.
- Pupils make less progress when teacher turnover at their school is high. Research shows that high turnover in a school has a disruptive effect on pupil learning and reduces attainment as a result.<sup>82</sup>

### **The case for an increase in the pay of teachers and school leaders**

142. NAHT's submissions to the STRB on its 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> remits set out how:

- the growth in private sector pay was affecting the graduate recruitment market
- the statutory salaries of teachers and school leaders had decreased in real terms since 2010
- starting salaries compared to leading graduate employers.

143. Since those submissions the attractiveness of teaching as a graduate profession has **weakened further** by comparison to the overall employment market. In April 2018, median gross weekly earnings for full-time employees were £569, up 3.5% from £550 in 2017. The 3.5% growth seen this year is the highest growth in earnings since 2008.<sup>83</sup>

144. In contrast to the general trend across OECD countries, teachers' statutory salaries in England were worth around 10 per cent less in real terms in 2017 than they were in 2005.<sup>84</sup>

145. OECD's 2017 analysis found that teachers' salaries were between 9 and 16 per cent lower than other graduates,<sup>85</sup> and that average gross earnings for all comparator professions were over 20 per cent above those of secondary school teachers, and over 32 percent ahead of primary school teachers.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> [Commission on Inequality in Education](#), June 2017

<sup>83</sup> [Employee earnings in the UK: 2018, ONS](#)

<sup>84</sup> [Education at a glance: United Kingdom, OECD](#)

<sup>85</sup> [OECD, Education at a Glance, 2017](#)

<sup>86</sup> [Incomes Data Research, 2016](#)

146. The Education Policy Institute (EPI) found that teachers' pay is below average when compared to similarly educated workers in the wider economy, and that in England the ratio between teachers' working hours and the average for the whole economy is 17 per cent greater than for teachers in other countries where pay is also below average.<sup>87</sup> These data do not paint a picture of a profession where remuneration is commensurate with hard work, long hours and stringent accountability.
147. Teaching competes for new graduates against careers and other professions with clear milestones for career and salary progression, and a commitment to an investment in continuing professional development (CPD). Once again, teaching compares badly to other professions. Our *Breaking point* survey demonstrated how difficult it is for school leaders to invest in their own staff, with 70 per cent of respondents telling us that they had been forced to make cuts to their CPD budgets; a four percentage point increase the previous year.<sup>88</sup>
148. The UK Graduate Careers Survey in 2017 found that final year students expect to be paid a salary of £43,200 five years after leaving university – a level of salary progression unlikely to be achieved in teaching.<sup>89</sup>
149. As noted in our last submission teaching cannot compete with leading graduate employers, where starting salaries range from £30,000 to £45,000 and the median graduate starting salary (from the UK's leading employers) is £30,000.<sup>90</sup>
150. Against this backdrop it is, perhaps, unsurprising that our 2018 recruitment survey once again demonstrates that all too often recruitment campaigns fail to produce enough high-quality candidates. In 2018 the most commonly reported reason for struggling or failing to recruit a Newly Qualified Teacher (NQT) was a shortage of quality applicants in the area (cited by 59 per cent of respondents, a 19 per cent increase on 2016). A similar rise percentage was recorded for all other teaching roles, with 61 per cent of respondents reporting that a lack of quality was responsible for the failure to recruit.
151. Qualitative and anecdotal evidence indicates that in more challenging environments, such as Opportunity Areas, it is even more difficult to attract good quality applicants.
152. It's clear that high quality graduates are less likely to be attracted to teaching as a profession when real pay has been in decline for nearly a decade. As noted above, government marketing emphasises the

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<sup>87</sup> [EPI \(2016\). Teacher workload and professional development in England's secondary schools: insights from TALIS](#)

<sup>88</sup> [NAHT Breaking Point survey](#)

<sup>89</sup> [The UK Graduate Careers Survey 2017](#)

<sup>90</sup> [The graduate market in 2018, High Fliers Research Ltd](#)

‘vocational’ nature of teaching, and the personal and emotional reward that teachers gain from the achievement of their pupils.

153. However, the existing financial rewards of teaching are not commensurate with long working hours, a high stress environment underpinned by punitive measures of accountability and a high-stakes system of school inspection. Nor is such a system likely to deliver career longevity.

### **Conclusion – the pressing need for an increase in pay to all salaries and allowances in payment**

154. Over the last few years, school leaders have risen to the challenge of fundamental changes to almost every aspect of the school curriculum and statutory assessment. They have managed the impact of a crisis in both school funding and teacher recruitment and worked within the context of a punitive accountability system that means that one bad year of results can be career ending. They have attempted to shield their staff and keep them motivated while they themselves have struggled with long hours and excessive workload. Many find it increasingly difficult to keep sight of the love of their role, even though they are driven by the strong moral purpose that drew them to the profession.

155. Teachers and school leaders have suffered almost a decade of real terms cuts to the value of their pay. It’s no surprise, then, that teaching is not considered an attractive career by many, regardless of the professional satisfaction that can be gained from helping young people to achieve their potential.

156. In 2018 we warned that there was compelling evidence that the restrictions that government had placed on the STRB’s remit, had been an important factor in the bringing recruitment to ITT courses, and teacher supply more generally, close to a state of collapse.

157. The opportunity to reset the narrative was squandered by government, in spite of the STRB’s clear recommendations. The 2018/19 pay award failed its most basic test – that of **fairness**.

158. Overall, two-thirds of the profession received a below inflation pay award, again. School leaders fared worst of all – granted a derisory pay uplift of just 1.5 per cent after years of enforced pay restraint.

159. The message to school leaders from government was that they were worth less than all other public servants. Those leading our schools will shape future generations – yet they received less than leaders in the army, the police or the prison service. And less than their own staff on the main pay range.

160. There is no room for complacency – the targets for trainee teachers have been missed for six consecutive years; retention rates for teachers and school leaders are worsening; and the leadership pipeline leaks at all points.
161. Of course, NAHT recognises that pay is not the only factor driving teachers and school leaders out of the profession. However, it is an important one. Teaching struggles to compete with other graduate professions to **attract and retain** the high-quality graduates that our schools need, and our pupils deserve. If DfE’s nascent recruitment and retention strategy is to succeed, it must be underpinned by competitive and attractive rates of remuneration.
162. Our submissions over several years have evidenced that the problem of teacher supply runs across the education system. It is difficult to attract high quality graduates into the profession, hard to retain them in their first few years of teaching, and hugely problematic to hold on to them for more than ten years. Ensuring that there is a **pipeline** of future senior leaders, head teachers and system leaders is becoming more difficult year on year. We find no evidence of any improvement on that position.
163. NAHT therefore believes that **every** teacher deserves a **cost of living** pay rise that protects their salary against further erosion against inflation, along with a **restorative** element that will begin to return the real value of salaries to 2010 levels.
164. We set out above a clear rationale for our **opposition** to any differentiated approach to pay and or focusing of uplifts or incentives solely on early career teachers.
165. We find **no case** that increases to pay should be focused on particular subjects, given that recruitment targets have been missed year on year. The slide in applications from primary trainees in the current recruitment round gives no room for complacency.
166. The evidence from our members is that differentiated pay awards are hugely unhelpful, creating division among the teaching workforce and unnecessary management challenges for school leaders. Recruitment and retention are inextricably linked: the investment in incentives to bring recruits into teaching needs to be matched by similar on-going investment to retain teachers within the system, and at all career stages.
167. In common with other unions, we therefore urge the Review Body to make a recommendation of a **5 per cent uplift to all salaries and allowances** in payment.

168. We urge the STRB to **reject** the notion of assessing the ‘affordability’ of any uplift. We explain above that NAHT believes that this is beyond the remit of the Review Body and a matter for government alone.
169. NAHT believes that any pay uplift must be **fully funded** by government to ensure that all schools have the resources to deliver the pay award. We reiterate that failing to fund the pay award would place many school leaders in the impossible position of wanting to act fairly and justly, without resources to do so. Such an eventuality would undermine morale further and is likely to have a negative impact on retention.
170. We recognise that there is to be a second remit for the STRB early in 2019. Nevertheless, we repeat the calls made in our submission to the 28<sup>th</sup> remit that the STRB considers wider factors related to recruitment and retention.
171. The STRB should recommend that teachers are formally recognised as **Key Workers**, in order to offset the impact of rising accommodation costs, the impact of which we noted in successive submissions. High housing costs affect teachers across almost all regions. Government should set out key worker incentives to offset living costs for teachers as part of a series of measures to drive better recruitment and retention rates.
172. The STRB should also recommend that specific actions are undertaken to **retain** serving **deputy and assistant head teachers**. Above, we have presented retention data and evidence about the way in which their leadership time is being eroded by a combination of the teacher supply crisis and the school funding crisis. NAHT urges the STRB to review the role of deputy and assistant heads, and vice principals, as defined in the School Teacher’s Pay and Conditions Document and consider how to protect their **leadership time** in order that they are able to deliver their strategic leadership responsibilities.
173. At the same time, NAHT believes that the STRB should consider how the STPCD might be **amended** to reflect the new forms of school leadership that have emerged in recent years, in order to clarify the role, accountabilities and responsibilities of **executive heads and heads of school** and of **school business leaders**. These roles are currently unspecified and uncodified, leading to considerable variation in how they are delivered and remunerated. These critical, publicly funded roles should be defined and formalised; clarity would be of overall benefit to the school system and help to add shape to the career structure in teaching, and may benefit retention among experienced leaders, offering a broader and better defined career structure.
174. NAHT also calls for a return to **national pay scales**. We briefly set out our view above that the so-called pay ‘freedoms’ have failed to deliver any benefit to the recruitment or retention of teachers and school leaders

within the profession. We will be pleased to submit further evidence to the subsequent remit on this matter, and also on the impact and efficacy of performance related pay progression.

175. As a matter of **fairness and justice** all teachers and school leaders require an annual cost of living increase that ensures that their salaries keep pace with rising prices, so that no teacher or school leader is worse off in real terms from year to year. We urge the STRB to adopt this principle, and to make a recommendation that will also begin to restore the real value of all teachers' salaries to 2010 levels over a defined period.

**Ian Hartwright**  
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NAHT

**Attachments:**

NAHT response to the statutory consultation on the Secretary of State's response to the 28th report of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB)